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THE COST OF A HIGHER EDUCATION: 
POST-MINORITY CHILD SUPPORT IN NORTH DAKOTA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The states are sharply divided over whether a noncustodial parent 
should be responsible for providing child support for his or her child’s post-
secondary education.1  Several questions arise: If the court does allow post-
minority child support, how does it determine a logical stopping point?2  
How does the court justify ordering a noncustodial parent to provide college 
support for his or her child when married couples have no such obligation?3  
Is it warranted to deny a child an educational opportunity when the non-
custodial parent has the ability to provide for such education but simply 
refuses to help?4  If the court does allow for such support, should it be 
limited in duration and amount?5 
Part II of this note will provide a brief overview of how post-minority 
support for college expenses is handled across the United States, identifying 
the advantages and disadvantages of such support.  Part III will provide an 
in-depth look at how North Dakota is managing the situation.  This note 
will examine the history of North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2 
(Support for Children after Majority) and take an exhaustive look at the 
few, but imperative, North Dakota cases relevant to this issue. 
II. FIFTY STATE OVERVIEW 
In 1971, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution was adopted, which lowered the legal voting age from twenty-
 
1. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Termination of Child Support and Support 
Beyond Majority, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/educate.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2005) 
(explaining that there are several approaches to post-minority support for college expenses). 
2. See Robert M. Washburn, Post-Minority Support: Oh Dad, Poor Dad, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 319, 
328 (1971) (stating that it is reasonable that a noncustodial parent’s duty to pay support should 
terminate at some point). 
3. See, e.g., Kathleen Conrey Horan, Postminority Support for College Education—A Legally 
Enforceable Obligation in Divorce Proceedings?, 20 FAM. L.Q. 589, 605 (1987) (addressing the 
constitutional concerns of imposing a duty of post-minority support on divorced parents when 
married parents have no such obligation). 
4. See Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, ¶ 21, 581 N.W.2d 130, 136 (asserting that a 
parent’s ability to pay post-minority support is the most significant factor to consider when award-
ing such support). 
5. See, e.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 522 N.W.2d 476, 479 (N.D. 1994) (declining to set a 
strict age limit on the award of post-minority child support). 
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one to eighteen.6  Most states then passed laws reducing the age of majority 
to eighteen for most other purposes.7  This change had a major impact on 
family law litigation: It essentially decreased the duty to pay child support 
by three years and eliminated child support throughout the child’s college 
years.8  Whereas a twenty-one-year-old may be more or less finished with 
college, many eighteen-year-olds are still in high school.9  Prior to the 
change in the age of majority, courts could provide for college expenses by 
increasing the amount of child support as needed when the child entered 
college.10 
Following this change to the age of majority, states were divided into 
effectively three different categories in terms of the way they addressed 
post-minority child support for college expenses: (1) jurisdictions which 
compelled post-minority support, even absent an agreement between the 
parties; (2) jurisdictions which enforced post-minority support pursuant to 
an agreement by the parties only; and (3) jurisdictions which neither com-
pelled post-minority support nor enforced any agreements of such between 
the parties.11  According to a recent study by the National Conference of 
State Legislatures, approximately half of the states fall into the first cate-
gory, allowing their courts to award post-minority support for a child’s 
college education regardless of whether the parties agreed to such a 
condition.12  The remaining half of the states fit into the second category, 
allowing for the award of post-minority support for college expenses only 
upon agreement between the parties.13  Only Alaska falls within the third 
category, prohibiting the courts from requiring either party to pay for post-
majority college support.14 
 
6. Horan, supra note 3, at 590 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1). 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 591. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. See Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 1 (concluding that the courts in 
Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia 
all have the authority to award some type of post-minority child support for college expenses past 
the age of majority). 
13. See id. (concluding that the courts in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming only have the authority to award post-minority child 
support for college expenses upon agreement by the parties). 
14. See id. (concluding that courts in Alaska will not allow post-minority support for college 
expenses). 
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A. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF POST-MINORITY SUPPORT 
The desire to provide children with a college education is a common 
argument in favor of post-minority support.15  A college education is indis-
pensable to obtaining and holding a reasonably well-paid and secure em-
ployment position.16  Compared to times past when a college education was 
only available to a privileged few, a college education today has become an 
economic necessity.17  College enrollment has drastically increased over the 
past three decades.18  In 1980, 26 percent of eighteen-to twenty-four-year-
olds attended college.19  That number increased to 32 percent in 1990.20  By 
2003, 41 percent of the nation’s youth attended college.21 
Years ago, children were generally more accustomed to supporting 
themselves at an earlier age since a college education was relatively un-
common.22  In contrast, children of today remain in school for a longer 
period of time, and consequently do not mature or become self-sufficient 
until later in life.23  Hence, children are maturing later in life but are ex-
pected to assume responsibility earlier.24  Stated in a different way, a child’s 
employment opportunities do not improve merely because he reaches the 
age of majority.25  If a child cannot get a suitable job without a college 
education, and if he is incapable of earning a living while attending school, 
then the extent of support should be determined by the facts of each case.26  
The age of the child should not be the only determinative factor the court 
considers when addressing the issue of post-minority support.27 
Just as the number of individuals attending college has increased, so 
has the cost of acquiring such an education.28  Between 1989 and 1990, the 
 
15. Horan, supra note 3, at 603. 
16. See id. at 604 (citing French v. French, 378 A.2d 1127, 1129 (N.H. 1977)) (stating that as 
a result of present conditions, with rare exceptions, no individual’s education is completed at age 
eighteen, nor in practically all professions, until well after age twenty-one). 
17. Id. at 603 (citing Washburn, supra note 2, at 326). 





22. Horan, supra note 3, at 604. 
23. Washburn, supra note 2, at 329. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 328. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. See Nat’l Cent. for Educ. Statistics, Youth Indicator 24: College Costs (2005), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/youthindicators/Indicators.asp?PubPageNumber=24.  The net cost is 
equal to tuition and fees, plus estimated cost of living expenses, minus all grants received by the 
student.  Id. 
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average annual net cost at a four-year public university was $8,900.29  In the 
academic year 1999-2000, that figure increased to $10,500.30  Because of 
the growing trend of receiving a college education, custodial parents may be 
faced with a double dilemma of child support terminating just when their 
expenses for the child are reaching an all-time high.31  Children of divorce, 
as well as their custodial parents, are less likely to be in a position to afford 
college.32  Coincidently, these same children have an even greater need for 
the education to offset some of the disadvantages stemming from the 
divorce.33  This predicament leaves the child and custodial parent at a 
greater risk for social and economic difficulties.34 
The financial strains placed upon children of divorce and the custodial 
parents are further enhanced if the noncustodial parent’s income becomes a 
factor in eligibility for financial aid.35  The federal government does not 
consider the noncustodial parent’s income and assets in determining a 
student’s financial needs.36  However, many private colleges do consider 
the noncustodial parent as a potential source of support and require a sup-
plemental financial aid form from the noncustodial parent, which may 
affect the awarding of the school’s own aid.37  For example, Georgetown 
University’s financial aid policy states: 
[P]arental responsibility for educational costs does not cease upon 
divorce or separation.  The University expects that both natural 
parents (even when divorced or separated) will provide funds for 
educational expenses based on their ability to contribute from their 
income and assets.  Both natural parents will be expected to submit 




31. Horan, supra note 3, at 602 (citing LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 
278 (1985)). 
32. Judith G. McMullen, Father (or Mother) Knows Best: An Argument Against Including 
Post-Majority Education Expenses in Court-Ordered Child Support, 34 IND. L. REV. 343, 366 
(2001). 
33. Id.  Children of divorce are disadvantaged not only financially, but emotionally as well.  
Id. at 367.  “Wallerstein and Blakeslee reported that in a group they studied, one third of the 
children were doing significantly worse five years after the divorce, when factors such as 
depression, behavior and learning problems were considered.” Id. (citing JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN 
& SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER 
DIVORCE 158-59 (1989)). 
34. Id. 
35. Horan, supra note 3, at 602-03. 
36. FinAid, Divorce and Financial Aid—Obligation to Help Pay for College, 
http://www.finaid.org/questions/divorce.phtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). 
37. Id. 
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college expenses commensurate with their ability rather than their 
willingness to contribute.38 
Thus, the noncustodial parent’s income may increase the child’s and the 
custodial parent’s financial obligation, yet the noncustodial parent does not 
share the financial consequence of this fact.39 
Finally, the court’s ability to award post-minority support mitigates the 
harsh economic impact of the divorce on children.40  Providing post-
minority support is intended to ensure that a child’s life opportunities are 
not unduly diminished by the family breakdown.41  It also ensures that a 
parent who does not reside with a child invests in the child’s future as he or 
she would if he or she were sharing a home with the child.42  By allowing 
post-minority child support for college expenses, the court is acting in loco 
parentis in an attempt to place the child in the position he or she would 
have been in but for the divorce.43 
It is no mystery that parents have sustained the vast burden of paying 
for their children’s college educations.44  In contrast to past centuries, the 
business of parents paying to educate their children has become the main 
occasion for intergenerational wealth transfer.45 A child’s education is 
replacing inheritance, as lifetime transfers are displacing succession on 
 
38. Georgetown Univ. Undergraduate Bulletin 2005-2006, available at 
http://www/georgetown.edu/undergrad/bulletin/expenses3.html.  Eligibility for Georgetown 
scholarship assistance is based on the income and assets of either the custodial parent and 
stepparent or the custodial parent and noncustodial parent.  Id.  A contribution will be sought from 
only two of the three parties, but information is collected from all three in order to determine 
ability to contribute towards educational expenses.  Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Horan, supra note 3, at 605. 
41. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: PROVIDING FOR A CHILD’S 
LIFE OPPORTUNITIES § 3.12 (2002).  The A.L.I. provides: 
(1) [T]he child-support rules should provide that a child not suffer loss of life 
opportunities that the child’s parents are able to provide without undue hardship to 
themselves or their other dependents. (2) Life opportunities should include but not be 
limited to: (a) postsecondary education and vocational training; (b) preprimary, 
primary and secondary education; and (c) specialized education and training 
appropriate to the child’s special talents or disabilities. . . . 
Id. 
42. Id. 
43. See Horan, supra note 3, at 605 (citing Patrick C. Marshall, Post-Minority Child Support 
in Dissolution Proceedings, 54 WASH. L. REV. 459, 470-71 (1979)) (stating that post-minority 
support allows the court to mitigate the harsh impact of divorce on children).  In loco parentis is 
Latin for “in the place of a parent.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004).  It means 
relating to or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking all or some of the 
responsibilities of a parent.  Id. 
44. John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 
MICH. L. REV. 722, 732 (1988). 
45. Id. 
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death.46  In the past, children expected transfers of the farm or estate.47  
Today, children expect help paying for their educations and do not depend 
upon wealth transfers at their parents’ deaths.48 
B. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION TO POST-MINORITY SUPPORT 
One prevailing concern courts have with awarding post-minority 
support for college expenses is whether it is constitutionally permissible to 
impose such a duty on divorced parents when married parents have no such 
obligation.49  The Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
provides that persons who are similarly situated in relation to a statute must 
be treated in the same manner.50  Because the issue of post-minority child 
support is not related to a suspect classification,51 courts need only apply 
rational basis scrutiny when deciding if a statute awarding such support is 
constitutional.52  Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute is constitutional if it 
is rationally related to some legitimate government interest.53  When con-
sidering post-minority child support, states have a legitimate interest in 
protecting the welfare of children and society as a whole.54  Therefore, the 
argument that awarding post-minority child support is unconstitutional has 
been unsuccessful in most situations.55 
An additional concern is the lack of control given to the noncustodial 
parent who is ordered to pay support.56  While most married parents are 
willing to assist their child in obtaining a higher education, the parents 
retain some control over their adult child and can withdraw support at any 
time.57  On the other hand, a parent who has been ordered to pay college 
support may have no control over his or her child, specifically pertaining to 
 
46. Id. at 735. 
47. Id. at 736. 
48. Id. 
49. Horan, supra note 3, at 605. 
50. Lindsay E. Cohen, Daddy, Will You Buy Me a College Education?  Children of Divorce 
and the Constitutional Implications of Noncustodial Parents Providing for Higher Education, 66 
MO. L. REV. 187, 194 (2001). 
51. See id. (declaring that traditionally, only classifications based on race, national origin, 
and illegitimacy have constituted “suspect classes”). 
52. Childers v. Childers, 575 P.2d 201, 209 (Wash. 1978). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Horan, supra note 3, at 605.  See generally Cohen, supra note 50, at 196 (stating that 
very few statutes allowing support for post-secondary education have been struck down as 
unconstitutional). 
56. Horan, supra note 3, at 605-06. 
57. Id. at 605 (citing Grapin v. Grapin, 450 So. 2d 853, 854 (Fla. 1984)). 
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the choice of school, field of study, academic performance, and living 
arrangements.58 
Another legitimate concern is whether it is fair to award support to a 
child who has not seen or interacted with the noncustodial parent in several 
years and does not maintain any relationship with that parent.59  Sending a 
child to college is expensive and can require much sacrifice on the part of 
the parent.60  A child’s behavior toward, and relationship with, the non-
custodial parent should be considered when deciding if the child is worthy 
of the additional efforts and financial burdens placed upon that parent.61 
Some commentators argue that the gift of an education is a form of an 
intergenerational transfer of wealth, such as an inheritance, and in this 
country, testators are practically unrestricted in their ability to transfer their 
possessions or disinherit their children if they so desire.62  Just as a testator 
may prefer to spend all of his money or to leave all his property to a 
surviving spouse rather than to his children, a divorced parent may prefer to 
devote his current resources to an individual other than his child.63  A 
testator might disinherit a child on the belief that the parent has already 
provided adequately for the child, or because the parent believes the child 
does not need the support.64  A testator can influence his children’s actions 
by either rewarding them for good behavior or punishing them for bad 
behavior.65  In comparison, a noncustodial parent may also feel that he or 
she has already provided adequate support for the child.66  However, unlike 
the testator, the noncustodial parent lacks control over the child.67  Any 
direct incentive for the child to maintain a cordial relationship with the 
noncustodial parent is removed when post-minority support becomes 
mandatory.68  The child is allowed to reject the noncustodial parent’s value 
system with no ramifications.69  It is unreasonable to deny divorced parents 
 
58. Id. at 606. 
59. Id.; see Hambrick v. Prestwood, 382 So. 2d 474, 477-78 (Miss. 1980) (holding that the 
father had no duty to pay his daughter’s college expenses when the daughter had not seen her 
father for six to seven years and was extremely hostile toward him). 
60. Hambrick, 382 So. 2d at 477. 
61. Id. 
62. Langbein, supra note 44, at 733; McMullen, supra note 32, at 353. 
63. McMullen, supra note 32, at 363. 
64. Id. at 364. 





       
242 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:235 
the ability to use punishments and rewards to influence their children’s 
behavior.70 
Another negative impact of awarding post-minority child support is the 
lack of notice to the noncustodial parent regarding when his or her support 
obligation will end.71  If child support terminates at majority, a noncustodial 
parent can plan his finances accordingly.72  However, if a custodial parent 
can modify that support obligation to cover higher educational expenses 
past the age of majority, the noncustodial parent is trapped with an 
unanticipated support obligation for an indefinite length of time.73  Paying 
for post-majority expenses could jeopardize the financial goals of the 
noncustodial parent, such as maintaining a comfortable lifestyle or saving 
for retirement.74  People today need a good deal of money to retire com-
fortably, and middle-aged parents may prefer to ensure their own financial 
security rather than spending or borrowing heavily to pay for the college 
education of their children.75 
Many states take the position that when an adult child is healthy and 
able-bodied, there is no reason why the child should not pay his or her own 
way through school.76  A noncustodial parent may wish to decline to pay 
for the child’s higher education because of the parent’s belief that the child 
should be independent.77  Just as married parents have the opportunity to 
influence their child’s maturity, so should divorced parents.78 
Finally, there is the notion that voluntary support to adult children from 
their parents is more likely to foster a close parent/child relationship, as 
compared to a court-ordered obligation.79  The goal of post-minority sup-
port is to replicate, as closely as possible, the decisions that an intact family 
would make, and not to make wholesale awards of college tuition.80  The 
following section of this article will provide a look at North Dakota’s 
specific views on post-minority college support. 
 
70. Id. at 364-66. 
71. Horan, supra note 3, at 606. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. McMullen, supra note 32, at 364. 
75. Id. 
76. Horan, supra note 3, at 607. 
77. McMullen, supra note 32, at 366. 
78. Id. 
79. Horan, supra note 3, at 607. 
80. Id. 
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III. NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota has an unsettled history regarding post-minority child 
support for college expenses.81  A lack of clarity in the legislature’s intent 
has resulted in disparate North Dakota Supreme Court decisions regarding 
this issue.82  This section of the note provides a chronological overview of 
North Dakota’s development of college support, taking an in-depth look at 
major North Dakota Supreme Court cases and various statutory enactments 
and amendments to North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2, the 
provision governing post-minority support. 
A. DAVIS V. DAVIS 
In 1978, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Davis v. Davis,83 a 
case of first impression regarding post-minority child support for college 
expenses in North Dakota.84  As part of a divorce decree, the trial court 
ordered the husband, the noncustodial parent, to pay $10,000 into a trust for 
each of his four minor children, for the educational benefit of each child.85  
Any funds remaining in the trust were payable to the child upon attaining 
the age of twenty-two.86 
The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, 
stating that “[t]here has been a trend toward awarding moneys for the 
furthering of education for children, including a college education, by the 
courts of the various States, even though the parents are divorced.”87  The 
court, relying on an American Law Report, stated that courts have expressly 
recognized the duty of a divorced parent to provide a child not only with an 
elementary and secondary education, but a college education as well.88  The 
 
81. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004) (stating that the trial court is not precluded 
from awarding child support beyond the age of eighteen if the parties agree or if the court 
otherwise determines the support to be appropriate); Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 ND 49, ¶ 14, 574 
N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (holding that a trial court is authorized to order child support past the age of 
eighteen if the court determines the support to be appropriate).  But see Larson v. Larson, 2005 
ND 67, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d 13, 14 (holding that the trial court did not have the authority to award 
post-minority child support for college expenses). 
82. See Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d 130, 136 (holding that a trial 
court has the authority to order post-minority child support for college expenses under appropriate 
circumstances).  But see Larson, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d at 13 (holding that the trial court did not have 
the authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses). 
83. 268 N.W.2d 769 (N.D. 1978). 
84. Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 777. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 778. 
88. Id.  See generally E. Le Fevre, Annotation, Education as an Element in Allowance for 
Benefit of Child in Decree of Divorce or Separation, 56 A.L.R. 2D 1207, 1209 (1957) (providing 
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Davis court further explained that the determination to award post-minority 
support should be based on certain factors, including the financial condition 
of the parents, and the family standard of living prior to the divorce.89  The 
court stated, “We are not unaware of the increasing necessity of a college 
education or its equivalent, as well as the tremendous escalation of the costs 
of securing such an education.”90  The Davis decision was particularly 
important because it set a precedent in North Dakota for awarding post-
minority child support for college expenses, absent any statutory provision 
granting such authority.91 
B. ENACTMENT OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE 
SECTION 14-09-08.2 
In 1989, the North Dakota Legislature enacted North Dakota Century 
Code section 14-09-08.2, which requires a noncustodial parent to continue 
child support payments for a child that has attained the age of majority 
(eighteen years old) but is still enrolled and attending high school and 
residing with the parent to whom the duty of support is owed.92  The statute 
provides for child support to continue until the child graduates from high 
school or attains the age of nineteen.93  This enactment signifies the first 
and only North Dakota statutory provision allowing child support to 
continue past the age of majority.94 
C. 1991 AMENDMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE 
SECTION 14-09-08.2 
In 1991, the legislature amended the newly enacted statute to clear up a 
few minor administrative difficulties, specifically, which party is respon-
sible for serving the affidavit stating that the child is over eighteen years of 
age and still in high school, and who must provide such notice to the 
noncustodial parent.95  The amendment requires the clerk of court to serve 
an affidavit by certified mail on any person owing support for a child 
eighteen years of age, if that child is currently enrolled in high school, and 
 
cases which affirm the courts’ ability to award post-minority child support for a college 
education). 
89. Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 778. 
90. Id. 
91. See id. (recognizing the duty of divorced parents to provide a child with a college 
education). 
92. Act of Mar. 31, 1989, ch. 180, 1989 N.D. Laws 551, 551. 
93. Id. 
94. See id. (awarding child support beyond the age of majority if the child is still in high 
school). 
95. Act of Mar. 11, 1991, ch. 151, 1991 N.D. Laws 418, 418. 
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the original judgment did not specifically provide for the child support to 
continue.96 
D. 1993 AMENDMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE 
SECTION 14-09-08.2 
The 1993 amendment to section 14-09-08.2 had a considerable impact 
on post-minority child support for college expenses.97  The legislature 
added an additional subsection which provides, “This section does not 
preclude the entry of an order for child support which continues after the 
child reaches eighteen, if the parties agree or if the court determines the 
support to be appropriate.”98  Although the legislative history is limited in 
regard to this addition, one statement holds particular importance: “The 
amendment clarifies that this is not the only basis under which support 
could continue after age eighteen.”99  This subsection opens the door for 
awards of post-minority child support for college expenses, as it provides 
courts with a legal avenue created by the legislature to order such 
support.100 
E. ANDERSON V. ANDERSON 
In 1994, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Anderson v. 
Anderson,101 another case pertaining to the award of college support.102  
This case involved a stipulated divorce agreement between Lane and Myrna 
Anderson.103  The agreement provided that Lane, the noncustodial parent, 
would be responsible for each child’s college expenses for up to four years 
of college, so long as the child maintained passing grades.104  Lane, 
however, received a break from such obligations so long as the college 
expenses were covered by other sources, specifically from financial gifts to 
the children from Lane’s parents.105  The dispute arose when the oldest 
 
96. Id. 
97. See Act of Apr. 15, 1993, ch. 152, 1993 N.D. Laws 621, 623 (adding statutory language 
to allow the court to order child support past the age of majority in certain situations). 
98. Id. (emphasis added). 
99. Hearing on H B. 1181 Before the H. Human Serv. Comm., 1993 Leg., 53d Sess. (N.D. 
1993) (statement of Blaine L. Nordwall, Director of Legal Advisory Unit, North Dakota 
Department of Human Services). 
100. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(6) (2004) (granting the court authority to award 
post-minority support when it deems the support to be appropriate). 
101. 522 N.W.2d 476 (N.D. 1994). 
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child was required to obtain financial aid to pay for her fourth year of 
college after she had exhausted all the funds from her paternal grand-
parents’ trust.106  The North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the divorce 
judgment and ordered Lane to provide Myrna with $12,720.44 for college 
support for the oldest child’s fourth year of education.107 
Lane argued that the trial court did not have authority to award post-
minority support past the age of twenty-two, pursuant to Davis v. Davis.108  
The North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, declining to set a 
strict age limit for college support.109  It instead directed the trial court to 
use its informed discretion.110 
In the alternative, Lane argued that his post-minority support obligation 
should only require him to pay college expenses at in-state institutions 
where the child has been accepted.111 The North Dakota Supreme Court, 
facing a question of first impression, relied on a Pennsylvania decision 
which stated, “We are reluctant to formulate a rule which would, in all 
cases, prevent a child from attending the college of his choice simply 
because it is more expensive than the state-supported university.”112  The 
Anderson court did caution, however, that the child should not have 
absolute discretion in selecting a college, thereby unilaterally increasing the 
parent’s support obligation.113  Rather, the determination of whether such 
an additional burden should be imposed on the noncustodial parent is a 
matter for the trial court.114 
The Anderson court, recognizing the ever increasing necessity of a 
college education, as well as the escalating cost of such an education, held 
that “[b]alancing these countervailing forces is a job for which the trial 
court is uniquely qualified.”115  The Anderson court further advised that the 
trial courts should analyze the advantages offered by the more expensive 
college compared to the child’s individual needs and abilities.116  Courts 
must then weigh these advantages against the increased hardship that would 
be imposed on the noncustodial parent to determine whether the additional 
 
106. Id. at 478. 
107. Id. at 480. 








116. Id. at 479-80 
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expense is reasonable under the circumstances.117  The Anderson case 
represents the first North Dakota decision to uphold a stipulated divorce 
judgment where the parties agreed on the award of post-minority college 
support at the time of their divorce.118  This decision affirmed the trial 
courts’ authority to award such support and provided a more comprehensive 
analysis of how the courts should approach this issue.119 
F. JOHNSON V. JOHNSON 
In 1995, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued another decision 
addressing post-minority child support for college expenses.120  In Johnson 
v. Johnson,121 Carlotta and Daryl Johnson, husband and wife, entered into a 
stipulated divorce agreement.122  According to the judgment, Daryl was ob-
ligated to “pay to each child the sum of $300.00 per month for a maximum 
of four years, if any child shall attend college and maintain passing 
grades.”123  For the first three years, Daryl complied with judgment for the 
oldest child, Corey.124  However, because Corey refused to contact his 
father upon request, Daryl refused to pay and no longer felt obligated to pay 
for Corey’s final year of college.125 
Based upon a contempt motion brought by Carlotta, the trial court 
issued an order to show cause against Daryl.126  Following the order to 
show cause hearing, the trial court vacated the previous order to show 
cause, reasoning that Daryl’s obligation was for “collateral support,” not 
“direct child support,” and therefore, contempt was not an appropriate 
method of enforcing the judgment.127  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
determined that the distinction between collateral and direct support rests 
upon the kind of support that is ordered, not the age of the child for whom it 
is ordered.128  If the support obligation permits a child or custodial parent 
use of family property or other in-kind, non-cash benefits, the support is 
 
117. Id. at 480. 
118. See id. (upholding the trial court’s decision to require the noncustodial father to abide 
by his stipulated divorce agreement and provide college support to his child). 
119. See id. (addressing the issues of duration of post-minority support as well as a child’s 
right to choose which college institution to attend). 
120. Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 667 (N.D. 1995). 
121. 527 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1995). 






128. Id. at 667. 
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“collateral” support.129  If the support obligation is in the form of cash 
payments for the benefit of the child, then it is “direct” support.130 
The Johnson court concluded that the legislature intended for contempt 
proceedings to be available to enforce all provisions of a divorce judgment, 
including those ordering support for adult children.131  Thus, the court re-
versed and remanded for proceedings to determine whether Daryl should be 
held in contempt.132  Overall, the North Dakota Supreme Court’s holding in 
Johnson reaffirmed the position that post-minority child support may be 
awarded for college expenses upon agreement by the parties.133 
G. ZARRETT V. ZARRETT 
In 1998, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Zarrett v. Zarrett.134  
Robert and Linda Zarrett had two children together, Diana and David.135  
The couple entered into a stipulated divorce agreement in 1990, under 
which Linda would have physical custody of the children and Robert would 
pay $1200 per month in child support.136  This was Robert’s second 
divorce.137  Pursuant to Robert’s first divorce agreement, he was ordered to 
“pay college expenses which include tuition, books, room and board for 
four (4) years of college and, thereafter, for up to four (4) years in graduate 
school” for his two children from his first marriage.138 
In light of Robert’s college support obligation to his children from his 
first marriage, Robert and Linda agreed that he would not bring a motion to 
modify his child support on the basis that he was paying college expenses 
for his children from a prior marriage.139  The judgment did provide that 
either Robert or Linda were free to bring a motion to review the child 
support payments at any time, and for any reason, other than the fact that 
Robert was paying college expenses for his other children.140 
 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 667-68. 
131. Id. at 668. 
132. Id. 
133. See id. at 667 (determining that in appropriate circumstances a trial court may award 
direct or collateral support for a child over the age of majority). 
134. 1998 ND 49, 574 N.W.2d 855. 
135. Zarrett, ¶ 3, 574 N.W.2d at 856. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. ¶ 2. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. ¶ 3, 574 N.W.2d at 857. 
140. Id. 
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In 1997, with the help of the Regional Child Support Enforcement 
Unit, Linda sought to increase Robert’s support obligation.141  The trial 
court awarded Linda $1,992 per month.142  In calculating Robert’s obliga-
tion, the Child Support Enforcement Unit deducted $33,000 from his annual 
income for college expenses paid on behalf of the children from his first 
marriage.143  Linda argued that the deduction for college expenses should 
not be allowed under the child support guidelines.144  Robert, on the other 
hand, argued that the court was correct in refusing to order the 
presumptively correct amount of child support because the parties’ 1990 
stipulation took into consideration Robert’s obligation to pay college and 
graduate support.145 
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that “[t]he language of 
Robert’s first divorce decree indicates the college and graduate school 
payments are in the nature of child support.”146  The Zarrett court, relying 
on prior North Dakota case law, further explained that an order directing 
payment of post-majority support, including college expenses, constitutes 
child support.147  As such, the court concluded that the graduate school 
expenses that Robert was required to pay were child support.148  Thus, 
when calculating Robert’s child support obligation to Diana and David, the 
children from his second marriage, the trial court must take into 
consideration his college expense obligation from his first marriage.149  The 
Zarrett decision emphasized that a noncustodial parent’s payments for 
college or graduate school expenses are child support, and therefore, should 
be considered when calculating the noncustodial parent’s child support 
obligations in multi-family support cases.150 
 




145. Id. ¶ 9, 574 N.W.2d at 858. 
146. Id. ¶ 4. 
147. Id. (citations omitted). 
148. Id. at 859. 
149. Id.; see also N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-06.1 (1999) (providing a formula for 
calculating support when the obligor owes a duty of support to children from more than one 
family). 
150. Zarrett, ¶ 14, 574 N.W.2d at 858. 
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H. DONARSKI V. DONARSKI 
In 1998, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Donarski v. 
Donarski,151 another case involving post-minority child support for college 
expenses.152  Donarski was different in that the post-minority support 
resulted from a contested trial rather than the parties’ agreement.153  
Kenneth and Janet Donarski were married in 1974.154  The couple had two 
children together, Nathan and BethAnn.155  Kenneth also adopted Janet’s 
daughter, Amy, from a prior marriage.156  Janet filed for divorce in 1996.157  
At the time of the divorce, BethAnn was the only minor child involved in 
the action.158 
Because the parties were unable to settle, the trial court decided the 
issues of the case.159  The court awarded Janet custody of BethAnn and 
required Kenneth to pay child support on her behalf.160  In addition to 
Kenneth’s monthly child support obligation, he was ordered to pay “one-
half of BethAnn’s reasonable college education expenses, including books, 
tuition and housing.”161  The court went on to explain that “[r]easonable 
expenses are those incurred in pursuing a four year degree in consecutive 
years upon graduation from high school.”162  On appeal, Kenneth argued 
that the trial court had no authority to order a parent to pay support for an 
adult child.163 
The North Dakota Supreme Court was divided in the Donarski 
decision.164  Three of the five Justices, Justice Neumann, Justice Maring, 
and Justice Meschke, forming the majority, held that trial courts have 
authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses in 
 
151. 1998 ND 128, 581 N.W.2d 130. 
152. Donarski, ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136. 
153. Id. ¶ 4, 581 N.W. at 133. 
154. Id. ¶ 2. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. 




161. Id. ¶ 18, 581 N.W.2d at 135. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 135-36. 
164. Id. ¶ 27. 
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certain situations.165  Conversely, two Justices, Chief Justice VandeWalle 
and Justice Sandstrom, argued strongly that trial courts do not.166 
1. Majority Opinion 
In Donarski, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s 
authority to order post-majority child support, including college expenses, 
in a divorce action under appropriate circumstances.167  However, the court 
cautioned that a trial court’s authority to award post-minority support is 
limited, and must be based upon full consideration of the particular circum-
stances of the case.168  The court relied on a New Jersey decision that de-
fined appropriate factors to consider when directing a parent to pay post-
minority support for a child’s college education.169 
In evaluating the claim for contribution toward the cost of higher 
education, courts should consider all relevant factors, including (1) whether 
the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the 
costs of the requested higher education; (2) the effect of the background, 
values and goals of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of 
the child for higher education; (3) the amount of the contribution sought by 
the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability of the parent to pay 
that cost; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of 
school or course of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of 
both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the 
requested education; (8) the financial resources of the child, including 
assets owned individually or held in custodianship or trust; (9) the ability of 
the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation; (10) the 
availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the 
child’s relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and 
shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and 
(12) the relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to 
the overall long-range goals of the child.170 
 
165. Id. ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136. 
166. Id. ¶ 27, 581 N.W.2d at 137 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting); id. ¶ 37, 581 N.W.2d at 138 
(Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
167. Id. ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (majority opinion); see Zarrett v. Zarrett, 1998 ND 49, ¶ 
14, 574 N.W.2d 855, 858-59 (holding that a court is authorized to order child support past the age 
of eighteen if the court determines the support to be appropriate); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
09-08.2(4) (1993) (stating that the court is not precluded from awarding child support beyond the 
age of eighteen if the parties agree or if the court determines the support to be appropriate). 
168. Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136. 
169. Id. (citing Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1038-39 (N.J. 1982)). 
170. Id. 
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The North Dakota Supreme Court asserted that, of these factors, the 
parent’s ability to pay is most significant.171  The court further reasoned that 
a parent cannot be compelled to contribute to an adult child’s college 
expenses if the parent’s financial resources are lacking.172  In essence, the 
trial court must consider all relevant factors in deciding whether to award 
post-minority child support.173  The Donarski court stated, “It is essential 
the court consider evidence pertaining to the amount required for college 
costs, including books, tuition, room and board, and to determine the 
amount that a parent can contribute without experiencing undue 
hardship.”174 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also relied on an Alabama decision, 
Ex Parte Bayliss,175 for guidance to establish relevant factors for courts to 
consider when awarding post-minority support.176  In that case, the 
Alabama Supreme Court concluded that a trial court may award property or 
income from either or both parents for the post-minority education of a 
child of that dissolved marriage if such support is reasonable and 
necessary.177  The court shall consider “primarily the financial resources of 
the parents and the child and the child’s commitment to, and aptitude for, 
the requested education.”178  The trial court may also consider the standard 
of living that the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been 
dissolved, the child’s relationship with his or her parents, and the child’s 
responsiveness to parental advice and guidance.179 
Turning its focus back to the facts at hand, the Donarski court held that 
the trial court’s findings of fact were insufficient to justify an award of post-
minority support.180  Although the trial court found that Kenneth helped the 
two older children with their college expenses and that he had the ability to 
provide for a portion of BethAnn’s college expenses, it failed to make 
specific findings on the other relevant factors to consider when awarding 
support.181  The North Dakota Supreme Court explained that, although the 
 
171. Id. ¶ 21. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (citing Stanford v. Stanford, 628 So. 2d 701, 703 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993)). 
175. 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989). 




180. Id. ¶ 23, 581 N.W.2d at 137. 
181. Id.  Kenneth was a graduate from the University of North Dakota with a bachelor’s 
degree in social work.  Id. ¶ 3, 581 N.W.2d at 133.  At the time of the divorce, he was employed 
as the Director of the Grand Forks Housing Authority.  Id.  His net monthly income was 
approximately $3,200 after deducting taxes and BethAnn’s health insurance.  Id. ¶ 7. 
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trial court attempted to define the scope of college expenses and also 
imposed a consecutive four-year time limit, it placed no limit on the amount 
of Kenneth’s obligation.182  The trial court said nothing about the cost or 
quality of the education.183  For those reasons, the Donarski court reversed 
and remanded the case for additional findings of fact on the issue of post-
minority child support.184 
2. Chief Justice VandeWalle’s Dissent 
In his dissent, Chief Justice VandeWalle argued that neither statutory 
law nor prior case law supported the trial court’s order that Kenneth pay 
one-half of BethAnn’s reasonable college expenses.185  He analyzed the 
1993 amendment to section 14-09-08.2(4), which the majority cited as 
granting trial courts the authority to award post-minority support for college 
expenses.186  The Chief Justice concluded that the language “does not pre-
clude” found in subsection 4 only relates to the language already found in 
section 14-09-08.2.187  He argued that if the legislature had intended to 
require college support for adult children, it would have done so in more 
direct and specific language.188  Chief Justice VandeWalle stated, “While I 
hope divorced parents would continue to support their children in seeking 
college educations, that is a far cry from concluding a court can impose an 
obligation upon the parents to do so as a matter of law.”189  He further 
observed that there are married parents who do not provide a college educa-
tion for their children for a number of reasons, not all of them financial, and 
they have no such obligation to provide college support for their children’s 
post-secondary education.190  Therefore, according to Chief Justice 
VandeWalle, a child of divorced parents should not have a greater legal 
right to a college education than a child whose parents remain married.191 
 
182. Id. ¶ 23, 581 N.W.2d at 137. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. ¶ 24. 
185. Id. ¶ 28, 581 N.W.2d at 137 (VandeWalle, C.J., dissenting). 
186. Id. ¶ 32, 581 N.W.2d at 138. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. ¶ 33. 
189. Id. ¶ 29, 581 N.W.2d at 137. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
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3. Justice Sandstrom’s Dissent 
Justice Sandstrom also dissented in Donarski, concluding that the 
majority mistakenly relied on section 14-09-08.2(4) as a grant of additional 
authority to award post-minority support for college expenses.192  He 
argued that the majority’s holding was contrary to the plain language of the 
statute and to legislative history.193  Justice Sandstrom argued that the 
language “does not preclude,” found in section 14-09-08.2(4), was not an 
additional grant of authority, but instead was enacted only to clarify section 
14-09-08.2(2).194  He also pointed out that the New Jersey and Alabama 
decisions upon which the majority relied, both involved statutory provisions 
recognizing the power of a court to order post-minority support.195  Those 
statutes also defined children to mean dependent children, even if the child-
ren were over the age of majority.196  North Dakota, however, defines 
“child” to mean “minor,” and a “minor” is a person under the age of eight-
een.197  Therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to award such 
support under section 14-09-08.2.198 
The Donarski decision was important to the development of post-
minority college support in North Dakota because it was the first case in 
which the North Dakota Supreme Court relied on section 14-09-08.2(4) of 
the North Dakota Century Code to affirm an award of such support.199  
Accordingly, this North Dakota Supreme Court decision, as well as section 
14-09-08.2 of the North Dakota Century Code, appeared to grant the trial 




192. Id. ¶¶ 40-41, 581 N.W.2d at 139 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. ¶ 41. 
194. Id. ¶¶ 41-42.  North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2(2) provides for payment 
of child support past the age of majority under the circumstances described in subsection 1 (until 
the child graduates from high school or obtains the age of nineteen, whichever occurs first).  N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(2) (2004). 
195. Donarski, ¶ 43, 581 N.W.2d at 140 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE. § 14-10-01 (1999)). 
198. Id. 
199. See id. ¶ 19, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (majority opinion) (holding that a court has the 
authority to award post-minority support for college expenses under appropriate circumstances); 
see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(4) (1993) (providing that this section does not preclude 
the order of child support past the age of majority if the parties agree or if the court determines the 
support to be appropriate). 
200. Id. 
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I. 1999 AMENDMENT TO NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE 
SECTION 14-09-08.2 
In the legislative session following the Donarski decision, section 14-
09-08.2 was amended to: (1) eliminate the possibility of a filing fee for 
filing an affidavit stating that an eighteen-year-old is still in high school; (2) 
apply the section to orders that already require payment of support after the 
child’s majority; (3) specify treatment during summer vacations; and (4) 
give the obligor both knowledge of where the child is enrolled and the 
opportunity to ask the court to terminate support if the child leaves high 
school.201 
The 1999 amendment to section 14-09-08.2 was the last time the 
legislature addressed post-minority child support.202  As of today, North 
Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2 states: 
1. A judgment or order requiring the payment of child support 
until the child attains majority continues as to the child until the 
end of the month during which the child is graduated from high 
school or attains the age of nineteen years, whichever occurs first 
if: 
a. The child is enrolled and attending high school and is 
eighteen years of age prior to the date the child is expected to 
be graduated; and 
b. The child resides with the person to whom the duty of 
support is owed. 
2. A judgment or order may require payment of child support after 
majority under substantially the circumstances described in 
subsection 1. 
. . . 
 
201. Act of Mar. 30, 1999, ch. 143, 1999 N.D. Laws 690, 690-91; see Hearing on S B. 2073 
Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. (N.D. 1999) (statement of Blaine L. 
Nordwall, Director of Legal Advisory Unit, North Dakota Department of Human Services) 
(testifying that the regional child support enforcement office had certain concerns about the 
administration of section 14-09-08.2).  Some of these concerns included the following: (1) some 
clerks were charging a filing fee for filing an affidavit stating that an eighteen-year-old is still in 
high school; (2) it had become common for child support orders to require payment of support 
past majority, using language parallel to that found in section 14-09-08.2, but which technically 
removed those orders from the description in subsection 1; (3) treatment concerning support 
during summer vacation remained inconsistent; and (4) obligors should have been permitted to 
bring a motion to end the support if their eighteen-year-old dropped out of high school.  Id. 
202. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004) (indicating no additional changes beyond 
the 1999 amendment). 
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6. This section does not preclude the entry of an order for child 
support which continues after the child reaches age eighteen, if the 
parties agree, or if the court determines the support to be 
appropriate. 203 
 
It is worth noting that the 1999 amendment to section 14-09-08.2, as 
well as the commentary and testimony found in the legislative history 
regarding the amendment, make no mention of post-minority child support 
for college expenses.204  The legislative history does not refer to the 
Donarski decision, or to any other prior decision, which granted the trial 
courts authority to award post-minority child support for college ex-
penses.205  Based upon the above factors, it could logically be inferred that 
the legislature supports the award of post-minority child support for college 
expenses.206  However, as the next section illustrates, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court had a different interpretation of the legislature’s intent. 
J. LARSON V. LARSON 
In 2005, Larson v. Larson207 made its way to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court.208  Glenda and Jerry Larson were married in 1978 and 
divorced in 1997.209  The parties had one child together, who was twelve 
years old at the time of the divorce.210  Pursuant to the parties’ stipulated 
divorce agreement, Glenda received physical custody of the child, and Jerry 
was ordered to pay child support.211  There was no provision in the parties’ 
1997 divorce judgment addressing post-minority child support for their 
daughter’s college education.212  In March 2004, prior to their child’s high 
school graduation, Glenda petitioned the trial court to require that Jerry pay 
post-minority child support so long as their child attended college and 
graduate school.213  The Larsons’ daughter excelled in both academics and 
 
203. Id. 
204. Act of Mar. 30, 1999, ch. 143, 1999 N.D. Laws 690, 690-91. 
205. S.B. 2170, 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. (N.D. 1999). 
206. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 527 N.W.2d 663, 666 (N.D. 1995) (stating that a court 
presumes that the legislature is aware of judicial construction of a statute, and from the 
legislature’s failure to amend a particular statutory provision, the court presumes that it acquiesces 
in that construction). 
207. 2005 ND 67, 694 N.W.2d 13. 
208. Larson, ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d at 14. 
209. Id. ¶ 2 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. ¶ 10, 694 N.W.2d at 16. 
213. Id. ¶ 3. 
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extracurricular activities in high school and desired to attend one of eight 
prestigious colleges in the United States.214 
Glenda argued that Jerry’s refusal to pay college support was a detri-
ment to their child because many colleges consider the income of both 
parents, regardless of marital status, in determining the amount of student 
aid available to a child attending college.215  The daughter’s top collegiate 
choice stated in its application materials that it expected both natural 
parents, even when divorced or separated, to provide for educational ex-
penses on the basis of each parent’s ability to contribute.216  The college 
also required both natural parents to submit financial information and to 
provide assistance for the student’s college expenses based upon their 
ability rather than their willingness to pay.217  Glenda argued that Jerry, an 
established attorney, had the ability to provide such support.218  The trial 
court denied Glenda’s motion seeking post-minority college support, stating 
that it did not have authority to amend the 1997 divorce judgment.219 
In another split decision, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that 
the trial court did not have the authority to award post-minority child sup-
port for college expenses.220  Justice Sandstrom, Chief Justice VandeWalle, 
and Justice Kapsner joined in the majority opinion.221  Justice Maring pro-
vided a dissenting opinion.222  Justice Neumann, a member of the court 
when this case was heard, resigned effective March 14, 2005, and did not 
participate in this decision.223 
1. Majority Opinion 
On appeal, Jerry first argued that the trial court had no authority to 
award post-minority support for college expenses, because the issue was 
raised and rejected during settlement negotiations for the divorce.224  The 
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding a strong public 
policy against parental agreements that prohibit or limit the power of a 
 
214. Id. ¶ 3, 694 N.W.2d at 14-15. 
215. Id. at 15. 
216. Id. at 14-15. 
217. Id. 
218. Brief for Appellant at 5, Larson v. Larson, 2005 ND 67, 694 N.W.2d 13 (No. 
20040248). 
219. Larson, ¶ 4, 694 N.W.2d at 15. 
220. Id. ¶ 1, 694 N.W.2d at 14. 
221. Id. ¶ 17, 694 N.W.2d at 18. 
222. Id. ¶ 19, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (Maring, J., Dissenting). 
223. Id. ¶ 18. 
224. Id. ¶ 10, 694 N.W.2d at 16. 
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court to modify future child support.225  Therefore, Glenda’s right to 
petition the trial court to modify Jerry’s child support obligation to include 
college expenses was not waived in the original divorce judgment.226 
The next major issue in the Larson case involved the interpretation of 
section 14-09-08.2 and whether that statute allowed the trial court to award 
post-minority child support for college expenses.227  Glenda, relying heavily 
on Donarski and other prior North Dakota decisions, argued that the trial 
court had the authority to award post-minority support for college expenses, 
“if the court determined the support to be appropriate.”228  The North 
Dakota Supreme Court rejected Glenda’s argument and concluded that 
amended section 14-09-08.2 prohibits courts from modifying a divorce 
judgment to include post-minority support for college expenses.229 
The court found that the 1999 amendment of section 14-09-08.2, which 
added a new subsection 2 providing that “[a] judgment or order may require 
payment of child support after majority under substantially the circum-
stances described in subsection 1,” allows a court to award child support 
only under circumstances similar to those of a child who obtains the age of 
majority before he or she graduates from high school.230  The Larson court 
concluded that the statute did not allow a court to award post-minority child 
support for college expenses.231  The majority, relying on the reasoning of 
Donarski dissenters, held that the “does not preclude” language of section 
14-09-08.2(6) only clarifies the statutory provisions set forth in section 14-
09-08.2(2).232  The Larson court reasoned that the language “does not 
preclude,” coupled with the legislature’s actions after Donarski, indicated 
the legislature’s intent to limit post-minority child support to circumstances 
substantially similar to those already expressed in the statute.233  The 
majority stated, “When the wording of a statute is clear and free of all ambi-
guity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing 
its spirit.”234 
 
225. Id. ¶ 11 (majority opinion). 
226. Id. ¶ 10. 
227. Id. ¶ 12. 
228. Id. (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(6) (2003)); see also Donarski v. Donarski, 
1998 ND 128, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d 130, 136 (cautioning that the trial court’s authority to award 
post-minority support must be based upon full consideration of the circumstances of the case). 
229. Larson, ¶ 16, 694 N.W.2d at 18. 
230. Id. ¶ 14, 694 N.W.2d at 17 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2(2)). 
231. Id. 
232. Id. ¶ 15 (citing Donarski, ¶ 42, 581 N.W.2d at 139). 
233. Id. 
234. Id. ¶ 14 (quoting Ralston v. Ralston, 2003 ND 160, ¶ 5, 670 N.W.2d 334, 335). 
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2. Justice Maring’s Dissent 
Justice Maring wrote a dissenting opinion, arguing that the trial court 
did have the authority to award post-minority child support for college 
expenses based upon the analysis set forth in Donarski.235  Justice Maring 
asserted that in 1998, the Donarski court determined under section 14-09-
08.2 that a trial court has the authority to order post-minority support, in-
cluding college education expenses, under appropriate circumstances.236  If 
the legislature truly intended to limit a trial court’s authority to award post-
minority child support in situations other than those described in section 14-
09-08.2(1), the legislature would have amended section 14-09-8.2(6) to 
explicitly reflect that, or it would have eliminated altogether that part of 
subsection 6 which states “or if the court determines the support to be 
appropriate.”237 
Justice Maring stated, “We interpret statutes to give meaning and effect 
to every word, phrase, and sentence, and do not adopt a construction which 
would render part of the statute mere surplusage.”238  When a statute’s lan-
guage is ambiguous, because it has more than one rational meaning, the 
court may consider extrinsic aids, including legislative history, to ascertain 
the legislature’s intent.239  Justice Maring continued by noting that although 
the legislative history was limited, there was no indication that the 1999 
amendment to section 14-09-08.2 was in response to the Donarski deci-
sion.240  The legislative history available indicated that the addition of sub-
section 2 was completely unrelated to the issue of post-minority child 
support for college expenses.241 
III. CONCLUSION 
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-08.2, which pertains to post-
minority child support, is ambiguous.242  Although the issue of post-minor-
ity support for college expenses has been addressed by the North Dakota 
 
235. Id. ¶ 30, 694 N.W.2d at 21 (Maring, J., dissenting). 
236. Id. ¶ 20, 694 N.W.2d at 18; see Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (providing that the 
trial court has the authority to award post-minority college support in certain situations). 
237. Larson, ¶ 22, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (Maring, J., Dissenting) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
09-08.2 (2004)). 
238. Id. ¶ 27, 694 N.W.2d at 20 (quoting State v. Buchholz, 2005 ND 30, ¶ 6, 692 N.W.2d 
105, 106). 
239. Id. 
240. Id. ¶ 28. 
241. Id. 
242. See, e.g., Larson, ¶¶ 12-15, 694 N.W.2d at 16-17 (majority opinion) (providing 
conflicting interpretations regarding section  14-09-08.2); Donarski v. Donarski, 1998 ND 128, ¶¶ 
32-33, 581 N.W.2d 130, 138 (providing conflicting interpretations regarding section 14-09-08.2). 
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Supreme Court in a number of cases, the statute remains silent.243  The only 
relevant statutory language pertinent to college support authorizes the court 
to provide post-minority support after the age of eighteen “if the parties 
agree, or if the court determines the support to be appropriate.”244  What 
does the North Dakota Legislature intend to achieve with this subsection?245  
What are the North Dakota Legislature’s objectives regarding post-minority 
child support for college expenses?  The answers are not clear. 
Prior to the Larson decision, Judy DeMers, a former member of both 
the North Dakota House of Representatives and the Senate, who co-
sponsored the bill regarding post-minority child support, clarified the 
legislature’s intentions regarding post-minority college support.246  DeMers 
explained that in the early 1990s, the legislature wanted to recognize that 
both custodial and noncustodial parents have a continuing responsibility to 
children older than eighteen, especially if they are enrolled in college or 
technical school.247  The Larson Court, however, declined to recognize an 
individual legislator’s retrospective recollection as determinative legislative 
intent.248  Ms. DeMers’ interpretation, had it been recorded in the legislative 
history, would have provided sufficient clarity as to legislative intent.249 
Due to the lack of legislative clarity, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has provided conflicting rulings on the issue of post-minority child support 
for college expenses.250  If and when the North Dakota Legislature decides 
 
243. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-08.2 (2004) (failing to make any reference regarding 
college expenses). 
244. Id. § 14-09-08.2(6). 
245. See Larson, ¶¶ 12-15, 694 N.W.2d at 16-17 (conveying that the language of the statute, 
coupled with the legislature’s actions following Donarksi, indicates the legislature’s intent to limit 
post-minority support to circumstances similar to those already expressed in the statute).  For 
additional guidance with statutory interpretation in North Dakota, see Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. 
Wimbledon Grain Co., 2003 ND 104, ¶ 28, 663 N.W.2d 186, 196 (articulating that the law is what 
the legislature says, not what is unsaid); see also Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead YMCA, 2001 
ND 134, ¶ 29, 632 N.W.2d 407, 418 (stating that the “justice, wisdom, necessity, utility and 
expediency of legislation are questions for legislation, and not for judicial determination”). 
246. Erin Hemme Froslie, College Bound, THE FORUM (Fargo, N.D.), Jan. 16, 2005, at A1. 
247. Id. 
248. Larson v. Larson, No. 200402048  (N.D. Jan. 26, 2005) (order denying request for 
taking judicial notice); see also Appellant’s Request for Taking of Judicial Notice at 2, Larson v. 
Larson, 2005 ND 67, 694 N.W.2d 13 (No. 20040248) (giving meaning to a single legislator’s 
commentary regarding a particular bill). 
249. See S.B. 2170, 1999 Leg., 56th Sess. (N.D. 1999) (failing to provide legislative 
interpretation of post-minority child support for college expense). 
250. See Larson, ¶ 16, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (holding that a trial court does not have the 
authority to amend a divorce agreement to award post-minority child support for college 
expenses).  But see Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (holding that a trial court does have the 
authority to award post-minority child support for college expenses in certain situations); Davis v. 
Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 778 (holding that divorced parents have a duty to provide a child with a 
college education). 
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to grant courts explicit authority to award such support, it is unlikely that 
noncustodial parent’s support obligations would be extended more than a 
few years past the age of majority.251  However, an increase in the number 
of years a child receives support is likely to increase the number of North 
Dakota high school graduates able to receive a post-secondary education.  
As the need for a college education escalates, so does the need for the North 
Dakota Legislature to make a clear decision regarding post-minority child 
support for college expenses. 
As it stands today, until the legislature expresses itself clearly 
otherwise, a noncustodial parent will only be required to provide post-
minority support for a college education if the parties agree to such a 
provision in their divorce decree.252 
Leah duCharme* 
 
251. See Horan, supra note 3, at 606 (stating that a noncustodial parent would be faced with 
an unanticipated support obligation, for an indefinite length of time, if the courts allow the award 
of post-minority child support for college expenses). 
252. See Larson, ¶ 16, 694 N.W.2d at 18 (concluding that section 14.09.08.2 of the North 
Dakota Century Code prohibits a trial court from modifying a divorce judgment to include post-
minority child support).  But see Donarski, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d at 136 (asserting that a trial court’s 
authority to award post-minority support is limited and must be based upon full consideration of 
the particular circumstances of each case); Davis, 268 N.W.2d at 778 (holding that divorced 
parents have a duty to provide a child with a college education). 
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